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READING HALAKHAH AS A SECULARIST
SANFORD LEVINSON*
“T“HE demand that I make of my Reader,” James Joyce once appar-ently told Max Eastman, “is that he should devote his whole life to
reading my works.”  Although Eastman wrote that Joyce “smiled as he said
that—smiled, and then repeated it,”1 one might well believe that the au-
thor of Ulysses and Finnegan’s Wake believed it.  We might read this as evi-
dencing a kind of megalomania, but those within the literary community
who proudly identify themselves as “Joyceans,” or “Janeites,” or indeed
“lovers of the immortal Bard” might endorse his basic claim.  What it
means to take a particular author, or a genre, or other form of art, truly
seriously is to devote one’s life to analyzing it in the perhaps hopeless
quest to solve all of the mysteries that texts inevitably generate.  To this
day, obviously, we can debate the implications of classic texts and engage
in heated arguments over what they truly mean.  My friend and co-panelist
Richard Weisberg has written notable exegeses of Billy Budd and The
Merchant of Venice challenging what had largely been conventional wisdom,
and one explanation for his zeal—a word I do not use critically—is that he
believes that these texts have served to shape our culture and, concomi-
tantly, that it is crucial, perhaps for the sake of our souls, to get them right.
I find it hard to disagree with him.  One explanation (and motivation) for
devotion, after all, is a belief that the object of one’s affections indeed
provides solutions to the great mysteries of life.
It is not difficult to extend the analogy to the study of law.  Those of
us who have devoted our lives to elaborating the United States Constitu-
tion might well agree with Justice Story’s aphorism that “the law is a jeal-
ous mistress,”2 even if he chose not to repeat Lord Hale’s statement that
“the law will admit of no rival, and nothing to go even with it.”  In any
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at
Austin.  I am grateful to David Caudill both for organizing this excellent
symposium on Professor Saiman’s superb book and for inviting me to participate
in the event on February 15, 2019.  This draft reflects my benefitting from the
excellent discussion that took place throughout the day.
1. See RICHARD ELLMANN, JAMES JOYCE (1982) (quoting Interview with Max East-
man, HARPER’S MAGAZINE (1931) (Eastman noted “He smiled as he said that—
smiled, and then repeated it.”).
2. JOSEPH STORY, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED UPON THE INAUGURATION OF THE
AUTHOR, AS DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH
DAY OF AUGUST, 1829 (1829) (“I will not say with Lord Hale, that ‘the law will admit
of no rival, and nothing to go even with it;’ but I will say, that it is a jealous mis-
tress, and requires a long and constant courtship.  It is not to be won by trifling
favours, but by a lavish homage.”).
(709)
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event, few people who have chosen to spend their lives studying the Con-
stitution believe that the subject is merely of “academic” interest and not
freighted with the utmost importance for the actual lives of those living
under its constraints and tutelage.
So this brings to me to Chaim Saiman’s truly remarkable book
Halakhah: The Rabbinic Idea of Law.3 In what spirit, exactly, does, or
should, one read it, where the “it” refers both to the book under review
and, more importantly, the topic announced in its title?  At the very least
the book Halakhah provides a treasure trove of fascinating discussions that
offer illumination on every page for anyone interested in learning more
about rabbinic Judaism and the Orthodox branches of Judaism that take
halakhah—Jewish law and its teachings of a particular way of life—with
consummate seriousness in a way that is not true of those outside the Or-
thodox community.  But that only raises the question of why one might be
interested in that topic and reading the book in the first place.  As a lawyer
and, increasingly, student of comparative law, I can easily agree that “the
rabbinic idea of law” is at least as valuable as a focus of study as, say, the
“German” or “Singaporean” idea of law, both of which present their own
challenges to parochial Americans who know only about the United States
Constitution.  As Kipling once wrote, “what should they know of England
who only England know?”4  Paradoxically or not, the suggestion is that
one in fact learns far more about one’s home and its traditions from en-
countering “alien” ideas; it is not that going to Paris will lead one to re-
nounce Britain (or visiting Rome will cause one to leave Jerusalem
behind), though that may of course happen.  Instead, it is at least as likely
that the trip outside will deepen one’s understanding of what exactly con-
stitutes the particular society that one identifies with and may well in fact
wish to return to with renewed respect and devotion.  In any event, one
almost always reads about foreign law not out of a desire to “convert” to
what is, after all, at least initially an alien system, but, rather, because of
what one can learn about the enterprise of law in general and even, as
Kipling suggests, about one’s own legal system when one places it in the
context of other systems.
So one response to Saiman’s book is simply to praise it to the skies, as
I have happily done, and to suggest that almost everyone read it, regard-
less of his or her relationship to Judaism.  Indeed, just as the old ad re-
minded its readers that one need not be Jewish to enjoy Levy’s rye bread,
so it is the case that non-Jewish readers can profit immensely from reading
Halakhah.  Saiman writes with almost astonishing clarity, and I literally can-
not think of a better introduction to what often appears to be the truly
forbidding reality of Talmud.  But that is not the same thing as necessarily
being able to predict the actual lessons that will be learned or, indeed,
3. CHAIM N. SAIMAN, HALAKHAH: THE RABBINIC IDEA OF LAW (2018).
4. RUDYARD KIPLING, THE ENGLISH FLAG (1891), http://www.kiplingsociety.
co.uk/poems_englishflag.htm [https://perma.cc/R7V2-B4QR].
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necessarily to agree on what particular lessons should be learned.  Return
to Joyce for a moment.  One can read him, at least in part, as an entry-
point into learning about a strange and to most of us alien society of Irish
Catholics.  To be sure, another of Joyce’s great novels, and probably his
most accessible, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, might have certain
“universalistic” lessons to teach about the process of declaring indepen-
dence from what is perceived as a stifling culture, including its religion,
and to embarking on one’s vocation as a writer, to help forge, as Joyce so
memorably put it, “the uncreated conscience of my race.”  But for many
readers, its most memorable lessons include its delineation of what to
most of us may well be a thoroughly unattractive Irish society where one
literally could not understand what it meant to be Irish without taking into
account the ubiquitous role of a highly dogmatic Catholic Church.  Few of
its readers, one might suspect, believe that the young Stephen Daedalus is
making a mistake in wishing to be free of the fetters placed upon him by
Irish Catholicism.  And, to do a fast-forward from the early twentieth cen-
tury to the present, one might be altogether delighted that modern Ire-
land has systematically freed itself from the bondage imposed by the
Catholic Church, as illustrated most dramatically in referenda involving
divorce, abortion, and same-sex marriage.
Although that’s not the only reason to read literature, our willingness
to encounter other ways of being in the world, to experience what literary
theorists call “defamiliarization,” is surely one reason to pick up books one
has never heard of that were originally written in languages that one does
not read.  Still, very few people read literature only for such non-parochial
purposes.  We also read novels and poems for what they tell us about our
own recognizable lives and experiences.  Yes, we might say, that was exactly
what it was like to grow up in Newark in the 1940s or to go to college in
the 1960s, etc.  Or a poem might capture exactly what the first love, or
breakup, felt like.  There is nothing wrong with that as a motive for read-
ing literature.  Even if true knowledge of England might require some
time spent looking outward, it would be bizarre to suggest that one need
not also read Shakespeare, George Eliot, or historians of English history
and culture.  My real point in raising these examples is not that there is
one right way to approach literature or any other complex aspect of our
culture, but, rather, that it might make a difference exactly why one picks
up a book and enters into debates about its value, either to oneself or to
other potential readers.
With religious texts, especially, there is a fundamental difference be-
tween those who might be called “insiders” and “outsiders” to the tradi-
tions for whom the texts are fundamental.  As Adam Gopnik wrote in a
fine recent essay in The New Yorker,5 it may well be incumbent on us, given
5. Adam Gopnik, How to Read the Good Books: From the Torah to the Quran, Sacred
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the world today, to become more familiar with Islamic texts, but one will
read and relate to them differently as an outsider than if one is a member
of the Islamic faith community (or any of the given sub-communities
within Islam).  This does not mean, obviously, that one must be a Muslim
in order to understand the Quran or even offer genuine insights into its
meaning, but it does suggest that the phenomenological impact of these
insights will differ depending on one’s own stance toward Islam.  An out-
sider might not really care if the implication of one’s arguments is funda-
mentally to destroy what heretofore had been one of the pillars of the
faith; for an insider, by definition, that is an existential crisis.  Consider in
this context only the different ways one might write about the Prophet
Joseph Smith and his purported discovery and then translation of the
golden tablets in upstate New York that established the basis of the Mor-
mon Church.6  Believers can presumably express only the most limited of
skepticism.  Non-Mormons, on the other hand, can give full sway to their
inclination to view Smith as a charlatan; whether he was merely self-de-
luded or a conscious fraud is less important than rejecting any possibility
that he may in fact have discovered divinely-inspired golden tablets and
translated their messages in order to found what is probably the most im-
portant new religion since the emergence of Islam in the seventh century.
Thus, the question I want to explore is what difference it might make
if one explores Saiman’s book from a basically secular perspective rather
than as an adherent of what might be termed, however problematically,
religious Judaism.  One possible peculiarity of Judaism, especially in its
American form, is that it allows one to identify oneself as a “secular Jew,”
instead of say, as is the case with those born within the Catholic Church, as
“lapsed Catholics.”  Secular Judaism represents the transformation of a
particular form of religious sensibility centered around a covenantal rela-
tionship with God into an ethnos of shared habits, including culinary pref-
erences, and recognizable styles of living in the world.  As we shall see
later, Saiman fully acknowledges this possibility.  The term “Jewish” now
refers to far more than adherence to halakhic injunctions.  It is now “a
more amorphous term that enables a wider array of identities to coalesce
under its banner.  This is a particularly important feature in a culture
where the majority sees itself as decidedly Jewish though not necessarily
bound to halakhah.”7  As a secular Jew, I can applaud his sociological gen-
erosity.  But one can scarcely completely dismiss the question whether Ju-
daism—and being Jewish—must necessarily be intertwined in some
recognizable way with God, including halakhah.  An earlier book, by
6. Compare for example, the excellent biography RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN,
JOSEPH SMITH: ROUGH STONE ROLLING (2006), with FAWN M. BRODIE, NO MAN
KNOWS MY HISTORY: THE LIFE OF JOSEPH SMITH (1945).  Bushman, a distinguished
historian at Columbia University, is also a believing Mormon; Brodie, though born
a Mormon, left the Church and wrote a decidedly skeptical overview of Smith’s
claims.
7. SAIMAN, supra note 3, at 238.
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Roberta Kwall, The Myth of the Cultural Jew: Culture and Law in the Jewish
Tradition, strongly challenged the coherence of “secular Judaism.”  She de-
nies that one can lead an authentic Jewish existence without living within a
world structured by halakhah.
Saiman, on the other hand, makes no overt arguments as to what con-
stitutes “authentic Judaism.”  His book is largely descriptive rather than
prescriptive; one might even see it as a kind of anthropological examina-
tion of what to most of us, even if we define ourselves as Jewish, is a dis-
tinctly peculiar culture.  But the people he is describing most definitely
have strong views on what does, and does not, count as an authentic Jewish
existence.  Few of them are pluralists who are genuinely tolerant of a num-
ber of different approaches to living one’s life.  Many of the adherents of
Halakhic Judaism would not recognize people like me—or perhaps even
devoted members of Reform or Conservative temples and synagogues who
might, in the contemporary world, have partners in interfaith marriages
who have not in fact converted to Judaism—as co-religionists, any more
than self-acknowledged lapsed Catholics would be eligible to receive com-
munion.  Academics are well aware that departments of literature may be
riven by deep differences of opinion on how best to read Shakespeare,
with genuine consequences, for example, as to who will be hired to
granted tenure.  Differences within the overarching “Jewish community”
are certainly often bitter, with consequences going far beyond the vagaries
of academic politics.
With regard to tensions within Catholicism, the fault lines might cer-
tainly involve theological principles: Does one really believe in the Virgin
Birth or the bodily assumption of Mary into heaven?  In recent years, espe-
cially, a great deal of emphasis, particularly with regard to political figures,
has been placed on the stance taken toward abortion, which is viewed by
the institutional Church (even if not by most practicing Catholics) as mur-
der.  Judaism is far less overtly theological, though one can scarcely deny
some distinctly theological underpinnings to the rabbinic Judaism studied
by Saiman.  “[H]alakhah governs as law imported from above, and as di-
vine wisdom explored from within.  The ideal of talmud Torah is for law to
be encountered in the sanctified space where regulation, education, and re-
ligious reflection meet under the canopy of God’s grace.”8  The version(s) of
Judaism studied by Saiman demand not only rigorous adherence to cer-
tain behavioral norms, but also an inner consciousness about the existen-
tial import (and theological origin) of the texts and traditions that
generate the norms.  In particular, at what might be termed its extreme
manifestations, a devotion to halakhic Judaism, especially as delineated by
Saiman, ultimately demands, at least as a regulative ideal, that one devote
one’s life entirely to the study of Talmud Torah.  To put it mildly, this is
no small matter, nor can its consequences be easily accepted by those
outside this version of the Jewish community.
8. Id. at 221(emphasis added).
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I suspect that I am not the only American secular Jew—or even non-
Jew—who became caught up in the Israeli television series Shtisel when it
became available on Netflix.  It is the absolutely gripping story of an ex-
tended Haredi—i.e., “ultra-Orthodox”—family in Jerusalem defined in
significant measure by their resolute rejection of what most of us define as
“modernity.”  Many of the story lines center on the commitment of men to
study Torah incessantly, with their wives (and children) simply accepting
the implications of that decision.  A central figure, the patriarch of the
family, is the principal of a Talmud Torah, and it is made altogether clear
that no secular subjects will be welcome into its halls.  From the perspec-
tive most certainly of secular Jews, the children are being systematically
socialized into a culture of willful ignorance about anything outside the
extraordinarily limited boundaries of halakhic Judaism.9  If one isn’t at
least somewhat sympathetic to this cultural reality, one will be tempted to
view it as a form of institutionalized child abuse, even if one grants that the
parents who attempt, quite successfully, to control their children’s lives are
loving and wish only the best, as defined by their own culture, for their
children.  But, to put it mildly, there is no respect at all for the notion of
liberal autonomy, defined in terms of the right (and ability) of individuals
to forge their own lives after introduction to, and contemplation of, vary-
ing possibilities.10  Nor, for what it is worth, will any genuine attention be
paid at the Talmud Torah to the fact that everyone is living, after all,
within an ostensibly “Jewish state.”  Israeli Independence Day is treated as
only a distraction, what with loud flyovers by Israel fighter planes and the
like.  The community of the Shtisel family is not so extreme as those
Haredi who reject the legitimacy of the state of Israel because, after all, it
was not founded by the Messiah, but it gives no evidence of having been
tainted by religious Zionism and the sacralization of the Israeli state.  I will
touch on Saiman’s final chapter on Israel toward the conclusion of my
own remarks.  But one suspects that the Briskers he describes, assuming,
almost certainly contrary to fact, they knew who James Joyce was, would
agree that seriousness should be measured by the willingness to devote
one’s entire life to the books at hand, that anything less is dilettantism or
worse.
To be sure, Judaism has never mimicked the Catholic tradition of mo-
nastic life that requires the repudiation of family life. Shtisel, for example,
is all about the complexities of family life.  But it is hard to discern in
Saiman’s book a Judaism that includes genuine regard for anything
9. I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to read a remarkable essay writ-
ten by Zalman Rothschild when he was a student at the Harvard Law School on the
extraordinarily limited nature of the educational system imposed on children by
certain strands of the Hassidic Jewish community in New York and the basically
resolute refusal by the State of New York to assess the degree to which the system
deviates from the ostensible requirements of the State for non-public education.
10. See, e.g., Meira Levinson, The Demands of Liberal Education, 25 OXFORD REV.
EDUC. 39, 58 (1999).
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outside of traditional Jewish culture (as defined by the Orthodox), not to
mention any real concern for what might be termed the demands of mem-
bership in a political society faced with the practical exigencies of organiz-
ing a functioning polity.  Perhaps one would take off time from study to
attend to family responsibilities or even business responsibilities.  Many
Orthodox Jews are diamond merchants, for example, and one of the reali-
ties of the diamond trade is that it is often governed, as a practical matter,
by the strictures of halakhah that speak quite explicitly to a variety of com-
mercial concerns.11  And parts of the Orthodox communities in New York
State and Israel are especially active in politics, using their propensity for
bloc voting as an effective way of securing benefits for their “discrete and
insular” minorities.12  Indeed, the New York City suburb of Ramapo has
been rent by the capture of its school board by the roughly 50,000 Ortho-
dox Jews living there and their almost complete lack of concern for the
actual vitality of the public school system.  The reason is simple: Most of
the Orthodox send their children to Jewish day schools, so why should
they care if the public schools are in fact grossly underfunded (by taxes)
and thus underserve the largely racial and ethnic minorities who in fact
attend them?  Only someone concerned about the community in general,
or even groups with whom one shares political and social space, might be
perturbed by public schools that can afford to meet only four days a week,
which have been forced by financial constraints to abolish “frills” like mu-
sic or art.  It is hard to imagine that particular Orthodox community lob-
bying public officials about the great issues of the day that are not directly
related to the parochial interests of the Jewish community.  For many
within that community, this might include some attention to Israel, but
only in its form as an exceptional state for Jews.  One of the lessons taught
by Shtisel (and, possibly, by Halakhah) is that the “goyim” and the political
communities they dominate are of no interest to a Jew even if prudence
requires recognition that they might have a certain degree of political
power that one must submit to and, on occasion, attempt to manipulate.
11. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Rela-
tions in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
12. See Isabel Fattal, A Heavy Blow to One of America’s Most Controversial School
Boards, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2017/11/another-blow-to-one-of-americas-most-controversial-school-
board/546227/ [https://perma.cc/YAY4-TXEV].  An alternative perspective is
provided by the school board’s attorneys.  See David J. Butler, Randall M. Levine &
Stephanie Schuster, Inside the East Ramapo Central School District Case, TABLET MAG.
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/294111/the-
birth-of-tradition [https://perma.cc/7JDV-2FHK].  On the notion of “discrete and
insular minorities, see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938).  As Bruce Ackerman suggested some years ago, it is not always the case that
such minorities are truly marginalized at the level of local politics, where they may
be able to seize the levers of power by disciplined political action. See, e.g., Maya
Shwayder, NY Jewish Community Wields Growing Political Power, THE JERUSALEM POST
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So the lessons taught by the book will differ quite substantially de-
pending on which of (at least) two audiences pick it up.  As already sug-
gested, some might be readers with an interest in comparative law who
want to broaden their horizons.  And, as I wrote in a review that was part
of a symposium that I organized on Balkinization on Kwall’s book in
2015,13 one might already realize that the “internal” materials of any legal
system—texts, legal decisions, etc.—are inevitably intertwined with the
“external” culture within which the legal system operates.
But I also indicated my doubt that her primary audience would be
comparativists.  At bottom, she was writing to her fellow Jews and trying to
persuade them that halakhah is central to any coherent conception of Ju-
daism.  She clearly seems to believe that to be a Jew requires at some level
that one believe that “God commanded the Jews to preserve their particu-
larity and gave them a path to guide them in this endeavor.”14  So, al-
though I am a member of what I suspect is her primary audience of
Jewishly-identified readers, it remains true that I reject her central thesis.
I publicly identify myself as Jewish, and some of my scholarly work has
been very much informed by what I learned about Jewish law and herme-
neutics from David Hartman and his marvelous associates at the Shalom
Hartman Institute in Jerusalem.  Indeed, a group of Americans who were
for many years part of an annual conference at the Hartman Institute, in
response to the conference now being terminated, organized a gathering
that took place in Washington, D.C. in May, where one of the two texts to
be discussed was Halakhah (we all agreed that it was an excellent book!).
However, as I elaborated in a short essay that I prepared for a 2014 sympo-
sium organized by Professor Kwall at DePaul Law School on the relation-
ship of one’s Jewish identity to one’s work as a student of the American
Constitution,15 my invaluable time at the Institute did not in one whit
make me any more of a “religious” Jew in terms of an internalized commit-
ment to the precepts of the Jewish legal system.  Jewish law certainly inter-
ests me, but, at the end of day, I feel no more bound by it than by any
other foreign legal system.  Indeed, from one perspective it may bind me
less, inasmuch as I do feel bound by, say, the Italian legal system when I
visit Italy or, for that matter, the Israeli legal system during my frequent
visits to that country.  But that is very different from feeling any bonds to
halakhic Judaism (even if, for reasons of etiquette, I will obey some of its
precepts when, for example, I am visiting Orthodox friends).
I am certainly fascinated by the feats of hermeneutic derring-do by
Talmudic scholars.  Professor Saiman’s book illustrates many such feats.
13. Sandy Levinson, A Symposium on Roberta Kwall, The Myth of the Cultural Jew:
An Introduction, BALKIN BLOG SPOT (Aug. 16, 2015), https://balkin.blogspot.com/
2015/08/a-symposium-on-roberta-kwall-myth-of.html [https://perma.cc/VK22-
ZYW7].
14. SAIMAN, supra note 3, at 283 (emphasis added).
15. See Sanford Levinson, The Possible Impact of Judaism and Israel on One Partic-
ular Career as a Legal Academic, 16 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 321, 329 (2015).
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss5/7
2019] READING HALAKHAH 717
He is clearly a brilliant student of the Talmud and able to convey its inter-
pretive riches to any reader willing to engage with the text.  Still, whatever
my self-identity as a Jew, I look at the halakhic system from the perspective
of the outsider, even if the fact that I am interested in it at all can no
doubt be traced to my particular autobiography.  Perhaps it is relevant that
I do not affirmatively believe in God, though I am well aware of a strong
tradition with Judaism that emphasizes orthopraxis, i.e., the willingness to
adhere to the demands of halakhah, rather than any kind of theological
orthodoxy.  From this perspective, who cares if one actually believes in
God so long as one lays tefillin every morning or observes Shabbat
(neither one of which I in fact do, however?).  Even if I define myself as an
agnostic rather than an atheist, that may be only a sign of my own intellec-
tual lack of courage.
Still, it is certainly the case that I cannot ascribe any divine aspect to
whatever is set out in halakhah, nor do I feel “obliged” to follow any of the
halakhic precepts.  Consider, for example Deuteronomy 27:10: “Thou
shalt therefore hearken to the voice of the Lord thy God, and do His com-
mandments and His statutes, which I command thee this day.”  In no way
do I find myself called upon to “hearken” or otherwise obey the ostensible
“commandments” set down.  It is not that I violate each and every one of
them.  I have not murdered anyone, though not because I would other-
wise have been tempted to do so in the absence of the Sixth Command-
ment.  Perhaps it is more relevant that I do continue to refrain from
eating certain foods, like pork or shellfish (though I gladly mix milk with
non-kosher beef); again, this has nothing to do with a conscious desire to
obey the halakhic prohibitions (I am, obviously, what has come to be
called a “cafeteria Jew” in terms of picking and choosing among the laws
of kashrut that I pay even minimal attention to).  If forced to offer an ac-
count of what friends often describe as basically irrational behavior, I talk
about the powerful force of habit, going back to how I was raised as a child
in a small North Carolina town, and the degree to which food customs are
ways by which marginal communities especially create a sense of collective
identity (and, for better or worse, become defined as “the other” by the
wider community).  One of the reasons I love living in Texas, for example,
is that the barbecue, the national dish of Texas, is almost entirely beef,
unlike North Carolina, where pork reigns.
In defining “the concept of law,” H.L.A. Hart paid great attention to
the “internal” aspect of law, by which people do X because the law re-
quires it and not, for example, because X is thought, on entirely indepen-
dent grounds, actually to be the right thing to do morally.  Although my
not eating spareribs is consistent with halakhic observance, it has precious
little to do with explaining why I refrain from spareribs but not from beef
ribs.  Perhaps I would have more difficulty explaining why I always partici-
pate in (one night of) a seder or that I cancel classes on (the first day of)
Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur (and fast on the latter), especially given
that I also feel increasingly uncomfortable with any liturgy that is suffused
9
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with acknowledgments of a divine sovereignty that almost literally makes
no sense to me personally.  But this takes us into the realm of individual
and social psychology, perhaps more suitable for a writer like Philip Roth,
rather than truly systematic theoretical reflection.
Kwall begins her last chapter by adverting to the title of her book:
“The ‘myth of the cultural Jew’ is that one can adhere to Judaism on just a
cultural level” without recognizing that he or she is simultaneously “em-
bracing a degree of Jewish law and tradition regardless of whether they are
aware of this reality or acknowledge it.”16  Here is where she most clearly
throws down her gauntlet to the Jewish readers of the book.  They are (I
am), she asserts, simply kidding themselves (or myself) if we deny that
“reality” (and its ontological connection to a divine presence?).  Well, if all
I have to do is to say that, there is some connection between my not eating
pork (or fasting on Yom Kippur) and Jewish law—it’s like trace residues of
arsenic in the drinking water—then sure, I’ll plead guilty.  Fasting can
clearly be traced back to Leviticus 16:29–34 and the historical fact that that
injunction “took,” as it were, within the Jewish community in a way that the
rigors of the Jubilee year or the duty to discipline rebellious sons did not.
But I don’t think she would find such a concession enough.
What is so striking about the book is Kwall’s own double conscious-
ness.  She wants to remind especially Orthodox Jewish readers of her book
that they are deluding themselves if they believe that halakhah is truly a
closed legal system impervious to the influence of the surrounding cul-
ture.  A noble cause, for which she deserves full support, and which I sus-
pect that Saiman agrees with even if that is not a central theme of his
book.  But the awful truth is that almost none of the contemporary Ortho-
dox leaders in the United States or, even more so, in Israel, are likely to
read her book because a) she’s a woman, who b) teaches at a Catholic law
school, and c) is clearly a political progressive with regard to such issues as
gender.  And the fact that her book is published by the Oxford University
Press probably doesn’t help either!  Perhaps Saiman’s book will receive a
better reception from within the Jewish community to complement what I
am confident will be the eager embrace from “outside” readers.  After all,
the remarkable endorsements on the back jacket include testimonials
from the former Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Jonathan Sacks, and
Mosheh Lichtenstein, the dean of Yeshivat Har Etzion.
It may be worth noting that Sacks represents Diasporic Judaism.
Though a strong advocate of Israel, he has obviously chosen to make his
life outside the ostensible “Jewish state.”  Lichtenstein’s Yeshiva, on the
other hand, is located in the West Bank, which left-secularists like myself
continue to view as “occupied territory” now for over fifty years, while Lich-
tenstein, no doubt, views it as part of Judea and the inheritance pledged to
the Jewish people by God through Abraham and his successors.  Although
16. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE MYTH OF THE CULTURAL JAW: CULTURE
AND LAW IN JEWISH TRADITION 281 (2015).
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this is not the occasion for a full discussion of Israel, Zionism, and the
meaning of a “Jewish state,” that operating culture, as reflected in the gov-
ernance of the state, has never broken free of those who are not only com-
mitted to Halakhic Judaism and demand its full integration into the sinews
of Israeli law, but also, and just as importantly, view Israel as in some sense
a sacralized state.  It appears clear that David Ben-Gurion made his own
decisions to compromise with the Orthodox community at the time of
Israeli independence because he viewed it, basically, as a declining popula-
tion that would in due time basically become irrelevant to the future of a
vibrant (and secular) Israeli state.17  He was, of course, completely wrong
in his ability to read the future.  As a result, it is an unfortunately open
question today whether Israel continues to manifest a commitment to lib-
eral constitutionalism or, instead, is increasingly casting its lot with a dis-
tinctly illiberal form of constitutionalism that not only privileges a given
ethnoi, but also privileges as well the halakhah and those who instantiate a
commitment to a halakhic way of life, including the priority of study of
Talmud Torah over any other ostensible responsibilities.  It should be
clear that this is not only a “theoretical” question; it is at the heart of con-
temporary Israeli politics and explains in large measure why Prime Minis-
ter Netanyahu was unable to form a successful coalition in May 2019 and
instead manipulated the Knesset to call new elections.  Avigdor Lieberman
refused to enter the government, explaining18 that “[w]e are natural part-
ners for a right-wing government but not for a government based on Jew-
ish law.”
So now, at long last, I turn more explicitly to Saiman’s book.  As al-
ready suggested, I learned an immense amount from every page.  It is sim-
ply one of the richest books I’ve read in some years.  From literally the
beginning, where Saiman vividly portrays a picture, based on Talmudic
sources, of heavenly argument about the meaning of Torah, in which God
participates as an equal, being challenged by angelic participants, one is
entranced.  I note that he clearly made a deliberate decision to avoid men-
tioning the passage of Talmud probably best known to secular students of
Talmud, Baba Metziah 59B, where rabbinic authority is clearly privileged
over even the intervention of the Divine Voice itself.  “The Torah is not in
heaven,” as the rabbis assert, which means that God no longer has the
authority to determine the operational meaning of its injunctions.  Al-
though Jews are enjoined, particularly at the High Holy Day services, to
give almost unending praise to a sovereign God, it turns out that the real-
ity is a quite odd form of sovereignty.  Hobbes, for example, would never
17. See, e.g., HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIE-
TIES (2011).
18. See Isabel Kershner, After Coalition Talks Crumble, Israel on Course for Another
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have tolerated a sovereign who allowed his subjects to dispute with him as
equals and, even more dramatically, to defy his apparent views.
That being said, what I found most remarkable about the book, in
many ways, is its chapter on the Briskers, who are, nonetheless, only a per-
haps extreme extension of the perspective that one must basically spend
all of one’s time in the study of what are, after all, a relatively few texts.  I
earlier quoted Justice Story’s reference to law as “a jealous mistress.”  But
the demands placed on law students and then law professors, let alone
ordinary lawyers, is almost laughably limited compared to that placed
upon what Rabbi Josef Soleveitchik called “Halakhic Man.”  Saiman writes,
for example, that for Briskers, “Halakhah is not primarily about regulating
the social sphere but a system of divinely ordained concepts that under-
girds the spiritual—even physical—universe.  Torah study is not about
crafting law to govern society but the founding act of Jewishness that
strives to master God’s wisdom.”19  To be sure, the Briskers do not re-
present the majority of halakhic Jews, any more than even distinguished
scholars regularly emulate Harry Wolfson, who was legendary at Harvard
for arriving at his Widener Library office early in the morning and staying
until the end of the day studying Jewish philosophers in his quest for un-
derstanding.  Saiman has clearly rejected the empirical world of Brisk, but
his book clearly shares the understanding that halakhah is far, far more
than a set of dry legal precepts and that one must immerse oneself in the
Aggadic materials—the stories the evoke comparisons with literature—if
one is ever to understand what is said to be Jewish law.
Indeed, for the comparativist, it is a deep error to attempt to reduce
Jewish law to a set of legal precepts divorced from the materials surround-
ing them.  Perhaps that is true, of course, for any body of law.  Can one
truly understand “American” or “French” law without full immersion in
the cultures that produce them?  Who, after all, does not agree with Oliver
Wendell Holmes that one must understand both “logic” and “experience”
when analyzing any given legal order—or that “experience” will ultimately
dominate “logic” with regard to explaining the survival of any legal system
over significant spans of time?  And just as one cannot understand a legal
order without paying attention to the surrounding culture, concomitantly
one may well be unable to understand the cultural surround without pay-
ing attention to the extent to which aspects of “the law” help to shape it.
But these quite abstract observations take on special importance when
one addresses the interplay between the demands of halakhic logic and
the imperatives of actually governing a political order.  This accounts for
the special interest of the last full chapter of Saiman’s book, which explic-
itly addresses “[t]he State of Halakhah and the Halakhah of the State,” the
latter, of course, being Israel itself.  As Saiman notes, “Operating in the
context of exile, halakhists had little need to deal with questions of theory,
legal or political, or address the structural issues of statecraft and legal
19. SAIMAN, supra note 3, at 211.
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enforcement.  Indeed, prior to the onset of modernity, there is scant
rabbinic reflection on such topics.”20  David Hartman used to speak of
Israel as representing the “return to history” of a politicized Jewish people
who had, presumably, been in exile from genuine political agency, often
captured, helpfully or not, by invoking the notion of political “sover-
eignty,” seemingly irrevocably lost by the destruction of the Second Tem-
ple in seventy CE.  1948 represents a fundamental change in this aspect of
Jewish reality, at least for those who do not share the views of those ultra-
Orthodox who believe that Israel’s claim to be a “Jewish state” is itself he-
retical inasmuch as such a state requires Messianic intervention and, most
certainly, not the proclamation of “independence” by secular Jews basi-
cally indistinguishable from the goyim.
Still, for better and worse, all Jews, whatever their specific religious
sensibilities, are in effect required to have opinions about the State of
Israel, especially inasmuch as its leaders (have the chutzpah to) claim that
they indeed speak on behalf of the entire world Jewish community and not
simply those persons, Jewish and non-Jewish, who happen to live in Israel.
Indeed, one of the most controversial—and I think completely unfortu-
nate—aspects of contemporary Israel is the proclamation by Prime Minis-
ter Netanyahu that Israel is fundamentally, perhaps we should even say
ontologically, a state committed primarily to the welfare of its Jewish citi-
zens and only secondarily to those of the roughly 20% of the population
who are not Jewish at all.  “Israel is not a state of all its citizens,” Netanyahu
wrote during his most recent bid for re-election.21  “According to the basic
nationality law we passed, Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people—
and only it.”22  Like many secular liberals, I find this notion repugnant.
Israel is a de-facto bi-national state, as are, for that matter, most countries
in the world today.  And, of course, as Saiman himself fully recognizes,
most Jews within Israel are scarcely “religious” as that term is generally
used.  There are thus multiple reasons to wonder why ordinary Israelis,
whether secular Jews, Muslims, or Christians (or other sects), would feel
committed to a “Jewish state” defined at least in part by adherence to
halahkah. It would be outrageous if the United States Supreme Court, for
example, explicitly relied on the religious teachings of Christianity (or any
other religious community) in giving meaning to the Constitution.  Tradi-
tionally, at least one seat on the Israeli Supreme Court has been reserved
for an Orthodox Jew who is regarded as an expert on halakhic teaching.
One might explain this politically, but can any secularist find it an admira-
ble feature of the Israeli legal system and culture?
20. Id. at 214.
21. See Benjamin Netanyahu Says Israel is “Not a State of All its Citizens,” GUARDIAN
(Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/10/benjamin-
netanyahu-says-israel-is-not-a-state-of-all-its-citizens [https://perma.cc/2624-
9QMH] (quoting Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel).
22. Id.
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To some extent, Saiman sidesteps full discussion of the propriety of
halakhah playing any role at all in the governance of Israel.  What is most
interesting about his chapter is his exploration, albeit brief, of the tension
between what might be viewed as the most “idealistic” aspects of halakhah
and the practical requirements of statecraft.  This comes out most clearly
in his discussion of what he calls “halakhah’s idealistic yet impractical rules
of warfare,”  surely a central topic for the state of Israel over its seventy-
year history.23  He discusses a controversy between two eminent rabbis
about the injunction to leave open a means of exit for the inhabitants of a
city under siege contrasting the “idealistic view” of Rabbi Shlomo Goren
(who would become Israel’s Chief Rabbi) and that of Rabbi Shaul Yisrael,
who interpreted the relevant Talmudic passages as being only “advisory”
rather than compulsory and who counseled accepting the advice of Israeli
generals who “thought a lockdown siege was tactically superior.”24  Rabbi
Goren remained unconvinced.  “In the end,” Saiman writes, for Goren “a
Jewish army must place its faith in God’s hand, and ‘we do not involve
ourselves in God’s mysteries.’”25  For Saiman, “This episode underscores
the difficulty of mixing spiritual ideals with the realities of governance.”26
One can readily agree with him, but then the key question is to what ex-
tent the “realities of governance” should always take priority over what
might well be described as the merely “idealistic” musings of rabbis who
never had to concern themselves with such realities.
Perhaps it is worth mentioning that the second book discussed at the
May gathering mentioned earlier, along with Halakhah, was the recent
book by Moshe Halbertal and Stephen Holmes, The Beginning of Politics:
Power in the Biblical the Book of Samuel (2018), a quite extraordinary medita-
tion on the lessons taught by the rise of the Davidic kingdom.  It is quite
easy to read those lessons as basically similar to those taught by
Machiavelli,27 Max Weber,28 or Michael Walzer.29  That is, political lead-
ers must always be willing to set aside the teachings of what might be
termed ordinary morality and instead get their “hands dirty” by doing
what the community interest requires, whatever its incongruence might be
with ordinary morality.  After all, Saul lost his kingship because of his un-
willingness to follow through on the imperative to commit genocide
against all Amelikites.  David was always willing to smite those deemed
Israel’s enemies, which often included complete communities including
women and children.  And, of course, it is all too possible to read these
slaughters as having been ordered by God.  At the very least, this raises the
23. SAIMAN, supra note 3, at 224.
24. Id. at 225–27.
25. Id. at 227.
26. Id.
27. See NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1532).
28. See MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1946).
29. See Michael Walzer, The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 180
(1973).
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all-important question of whether halakhah—and, ultimately, God’s com-
mands—are open to independent moral judgment (and critique).
Full treatment of such issues obviously requires going far beyond the
pages assigned to a book review.  It is a tribute to Saiman’s achievement,
though, that his book necessarily provokes engagement with the most im-
portant questions that anyone can ask about how to live one’s life, whether
as an ostensible “individual” or member of a socio-religious-political com-
munity.  His own relatively detached tone regarding many of these ques-
tions allows a freedom of intellectual exploration (and on occasion
criticism) that might have been discouraged by a more polemical book.
Halakhah is a book easy both to admire and to recommend to a wide range
of potential readers, whether or not they are within or outside any of the
communities identified with Judaism.
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